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 Overview of the Judgments
1 On the Right to Relay on the Nitrates Directive
Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 3 October 2019 in Case C-197/19 – 
Wasserleitungsverband Nördliches Burgenland and Others
1.1 Subject Matter
This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 288 
tfeu, Article 5(4) and (5) and Annex i A, point 2, to Council Directive 
91/676/eec concerning the protection of waters against pollution caused by 
nitrates from agricultural sources (the Nitrates Directive). The request has 
been made in proceedings brought by the Wasserleitungsverband Nördliches 
Burgenland (Water Association of North Burgenland), and other parties against 
the decision of the Bundesministerium für Nachhaltigkeit und Tourismus  
1 Only opinions, judgements and orders available on Curia.eu under the subject matter ´envi-
ronment´, ‘energy’ and ‘provisions concerning the institutions/access to documents’ have 
been included in this report. Due to the length constrains, only those proceedings that in the 
subjective opinion of the editor were considered interesting are included.
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(Federal Ministry for Sustainability and Tourism, Austria; ‘the Ministry’), which 
rejected as inadmissible the requests to amend or revise the regulation Aktion-
sprogamm Nitrat 2012 (the 2012 Nitrate Action Programme Regulation). By its 
question, the referring court asked, in essence, whether  Article 288 tfeu and 
Article 5(4) and (5) of, and Annex i A, point 2 to, the Nitrates Directive must be 
interpreted as meaning that natural and legal persons, such as the applicants 
in the main proceedings, who are responsible for  ensuring the supply of water 
or who have the option of using a water well, should be in a position to require 
the competent national authorities to amend an existing action programme or 
adopt additional measures or reinforced actions, provided for in Article 5(5) of 
that directive, in order to attain a maximum nitrate level of 50 mg/l at each 
intake point.
1.2 Key Findings
32 It follows, as the Advocate General observed in point 41 of her Opinion, 
that at least the natural or legal persons directly concerned by an infringement 
of provisions of a directive must be in a position to require the competent au-
thorities to observe such obligations, if necessary by pursuing their claims by 
judicial process.
33 In addition, ‘where they meet the criteria, if any, laid down in [the] na-
tional law, members of the public’ have the rights provided for in Article 9(3) of 
the Aarhus Convention. That provision, read in conjunction with Article 47 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, imposes on Mem-
ber States an obligation to ensure effective judicial protection of the rights con-
ferred by EU law, in particular the provisions of environmental law (see, to that 
effect, judgment of 20 December 2017, Protect Natur-, Arten – und Landschafts-
schutz Umweltorganisation, C-664/15, EU:C:2017:987, paragraph 45).
34 The right to bring proceedings set out in Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Con-
vention would be deprived of all useful effect, and even of its very substance, if 
it had to be conceded that, by imposing those conditions, certain categories of 
‘members of the public’, a fortiori ‘the public concerned’, such as environmen-
tal organisations that satisfy the requirements laid down in Article 2(5) of the 
Aarhus Convention, were to be denied of any right to bring proceedings (judg-
ment of 20 December 2017, Protect Natur-, Arten – und Landschaftsschutz Um-
weltorganisation, C-664/15, EU:C:2017:987, paragraph 46).
46 It follows that natural and legal persons, such as the applicants in the 
main proceedings, must be in a position to require national authorities to ob-
serve those obligations, if necessary by bringing an action before the compe-
tent courts.
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68 It follows that exceeding 50 mg/l of nitrates in the waters or the risk of 
 exceeding that level at one of the selected measuring points entails the obligation 
to implement the measures provided for in Article 5(4) and (5) of Directive 91/676. 
However, that directive does not oblige Member States to expand the monitoring 
measures beyond what is provided for in Article 5(6) of that directive.
69 To the extent that the values measured in a well or at another intake 
point, such as those of the applicants in the main proceedings, differ from the 
values obtained at the measuring points, it cannot be ruled out that the loca-
tions of those measuring points have been chosen, contrary to Article 5(6) of 
Directive 91/676, so that it is impossible to determine the extent of pollution in 
the territory they cover.
73 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the ques-
tion referred is that Article 288 tfeu and Article 5(4) and (5) of, and Annex i 
A, point 2 to, Directive 91/676 must be interpreted as meaning that, provided 
that the discharge of nitrogen compounds of agricultural origin significantly 
contributes to the pollution of the groundwaters in question, natural and legal 
persons, such as the applicants in the main proceedings, should be in a posi-
tion to require the competent national authorities to amend an existing ac-
tion programme or adopt additional measures or reinforced actions, provided 
for in Article 5(5) of that directive, as long as the nitrate levels in the ground-
waters exceed or could exceed, in the absence of such measures, 50 mg/l at 
one or more measuring points within the meaning of Article 5(6) of that 
directive.
2 On the Protection of Large Carnivores under EU Nature 
Conservation Law
Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 10 October 2019 in Case C-674/17 – 
Luonnonsuojeluyhdistys Tapiola Pohjois-Savo – Kainuu ry
2.1 Subject Matter
This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 
16(1) of the Habitats Directive. The request has been made in proceedings 
brought by Luonnonsuojeluyhdistys Tapiola Pohjois-Savo — Kainuu ry (‘Tapio-
la’) concerning the lawfulness of decisions by which Suomen riistakeskus 
(Finnish Wildlife Agency) granted derogation permits to hunt wolves. By its 
questions, the referring court asked, in essence, whether Article 16(1)(e) of the 
Habitats Directive must be interpreted as precluding the adoption of decisions 
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granting derogations from the prohibition on the deliberate killing of wolves 
laid down in Article 12(1)(a), read in conjunction with Annex iv(a) to that di-
rective, by way of hunting for population management purposes, the objective 
of which is to combat poaching. This judgment as well as the Opinion of AG in 
this case were discussed in J. Darpö, Anything goes, jeepl 2019 16(3), 305–318 
and J. Darpö, The Last Say? Comment on cjeus Judgement in the Tapiola Case 
(C-674/17), jeepl 2020 17(1), 117–130.
2.2 Judgment
Article 16(1)(e) of Council Directive 92/43/eec of 21 May 1992 on the conserva-
tion of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora must be interpreted as pre-
cluding the adoption of decisions granting derogations from the prohibition 
on the deliberate killing of wolves laid down in Article 12(1)(a), read in con-
junction with Annex iv(a) to that directive, by way of hunting for population 
management purposes, the objective of which is to combat poaching, where:
– the objective pursued by such derogations is not stated in a clear and pre-
cise manner and where, in the light of rigorous scientific data, the national 
authority is unable to establish that the derogations are appropriate with a 
view to achieving that objective,
– it is not duly established that their objective cannot be attained by means of 
a satisfactory alternative, the mere existence of an illegal activity or difficul-
ties associated with its monitoring not constituting sufficient evidence in 
that regard,
– it is not guaranteed that the derogations will not be detrimental to the 
maintenance of the populations of the species concerned at a favourable 
conservation status in their natural range,
– the derogations have not been subject to an assessment of the conservation 
status of the populations of the species concerned and of the impact that 
the envisaged derogation may have on it, at the level of the territory of that 
Member State or, where applicable, at the level of the biogeographical re-
gion in question where the borders of that Member State straddle several 
biogeographical regions or where the natural range of the species so re-
quires and, to the extent possible, at cross-border level, and
– not all conditions are satisfied in relation to the taking, on a selective basis 
and to a limited extent, under strictly supervised conditions, in limited and 
specified numbers, of specimens of the species listed in Annex iv to that 
directive, compliance with which must be established in particular by refer-
ence to the population level, its conservation status and its biological char-
acteristics, are satisfied.
It is for the national court to ascertain whether that is the case in the main 
proceedings.
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3 On the Admissibility of Action against an acer’s Decision i
Judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) of 24 October 2019 in Case 
T-333/17 – Austrian Power Grid AG and Vorarlberger Übertragungsnetz GmbH v 
European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (acer)
3.1 Subject Matter
This proceedings concerns an action for annulment under Article 263 tfeu 
seeking annulment of Decision A-001-2017 (consolidated) of the Board of Ap-
peal of acer of 17 March 2017 dismissing the appeals brought by Austrian 
Power Grid AG and Vorarlberger Übertragungsnetz GmbH against acer Deci-
sion No 6/2016, regarding the determination of capacity calculation regions.
3.2 Judgment
1. Annuls Decision A-001-2017 (consolidated) of the Board of Appeal of the 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (acer) of 17 March 2017 dis-
missing the appeals against Decision No 6/2016 issued by acer regarding the 
determination of capacity calculation regions in so far as it dismisses the ap-
peals brought by Austrian Power Grid AG and by Vorarlberger Übertragungs-
netz GmbH;
2. Dismisses the action as to the remainder
4 On the Admissibility of Action against an acer’s Decision ii
Judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) of 24 October 2019 in Case 
T-332/17 – nergie-Control Austria für die Regulierung der Elektrizitäts – und 
 Erdgaswirtschaft (E-Control) v European Union Agency for the Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators (acer)
4.1 Subject Matter
This proceedings concerns an action for annulment under Article 263 tfeu 
seeking annulment of Decision A-001-2017 (consolidated) of the Board of Ap-
peal of acer of 17 March 2017 dismissing the appeals brought by Energie- 
Control Austria für die Regulierung der Elektrizitäts – und Erdgaswirtschaft 
 (E-Control) against acer Decision No 6/2016, regarding the determination of 
capacity calculation regions.
4.2 Judgment
1. Annuls Decision A-001-2017 (consolidated) of the Board of Appeal of the 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (acer) of 17 March 2017 





journal for european environmental & planning law 17 (2020) 229-246
 dismissing the appeals against Decision No 6/2016 issued by acer regard-
ing the determination of capacity calculation regions in so far as it dismiss-
es the appeal brought by Energie-Control Austria für die Regulierung der 
 Elektrizitäts – und Erdgaswirtschaft (E-Control);
2. Dismisses the action as to the remainder
5 On the Concept of ‘End-of-Waste’ under the New Waste Directive 
and Used Vegetable Oils
Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 24 October 2019 in Case C-221/ 
18 – Prato Nevoso Termo Energy Srl v Provincia di Cuneo and arpa Piemonte
5.1 Subject Matter
This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 6 
of Directive 2008/98/EC on waste (the New Waste Directive) and Article 13 of 
Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable 
sources (the Renewable Energy Sources (res) Directive 2009/28), and the 
principles of proportionality, transparency and simplification set out therein. 
The request has been made in proceedings between Prato Nevoso Termo En-
ergy Srl (‘Prato Nevoso’) and the Provincia di Cuneo (Province of Cuneo, Ita-
ly) and the arpa Piemonte, concerning the rejection of an application made 
by that company for authorisation to replace methane, as a power source for 
its thermal and electrical power plant, with a bioliquid obtained from the 
chemical treatment of used vegetable oils. By its questions, the national court 
asked, in essence, whether Article 6(1) and (4) of the New Waste Directive 
and Article 13(1) of the res Directive, read together, must be interpreted as 
precluding national legislation under which an application for authorisation 
to replace methane, as a power source for an electric power plant producing 
atmospheric emissions, with a substance derived from the chemical treat-
ment of used vegetable oils, must be refused, on the ground that that sub-
stance is not included in the list of categories of biomass fuels authorised for 
that purpose and that that list may be amended only by an  internal act of 
general application, the adoption procedure of which is not coordinated with 
the administrative procedure for authorising the use of a  substance derived 
from biomass as fuel.
5.2 Key Findings
39 It follows from the foregoing that EU law does not, in principle, preclude 
the possibility that the use of a substance derived from waste as a fuel in a 
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plant producing atmospheric emissions must be subject to the national legis-
lation on energy recovery from waste, on the ground that it does not fall within 
any of the categories included in the list of authorised fuels, while providing 
that that list may be amended only by a generally applicable national legal act, 
such as a ministerial decree.
40 This finding is not invalidated by Article 13(1) of Directive 2009/28, which 
requires Member States to ensure that the national rules concerning the au-
thorisation, certification and licensing administrative procedures that are 
 applied to plants such as that at issue in the main proceedings are proportion-
ate, necessary, coordinated and defined, since, as noted by the Advocate 
 General in paragraph 93 of his Opinion, that provision does not concern the 
regulatory procedures for the adoption of end-of-waste status criteria, referred 
to in Article 6(4) of Directive 2008/98.
41 In the present case, in view of the fact that the vegetable oils in question 
in the main proceedings are not included in the list of authorised fuels, the 
legislation at issue in the main proceedings has the effect that that substance 
must be regarded as waste and not as a fuel.
42 It must be ensured that the legislation at issue in the main proceedings 
does not amount to an obstacle to the attainment of the objectives set by Di-
rective 2008/98, such as encouraging the application of the waste hierarchy 
laid down in Article 4 of that directive, or, as is stated in recitals 8 and 29, en-
couraging the recovery of waste and the use of recovered material in order to 
preserve natural resources and to enable the development of a circular econo-
my (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 March 2019, Tallinna Vesi, C-60/18, 
EU:C:2019:264, paragraph 27).
59 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answers to the ques-
tions referred by the referring court are that Article 6(1) and (4) of Directive 
2008/98 and Article 13(1) of Directive 2009/28, read together, must be inter-
preted as not precluding national legislation under which an application for 
authorisation to replace methane, as a power source for an electric power 
plant producing atmospheric emissions, with a substance derived from the 
chemical treatment of used vegetable oils, must be refused, on the ground 
that that substance is not included in the list of categories of biomass fu-
els authorised for that purpose and that that list may be amended only by 
an internal act of general application, the adoption procedure of which is 
not coordinated with the administrative procedure for authorising the use of 
such a substance as fuel, if the Member State could consider, without making 
a manifest error of assessment, that it has not been demonstrated that the 
use of that vegetable oil, in such circumstances, satisfies the conditions laid 
down in Article 6(1) of Directive 2008/98 and, in particular, is devoid of any 
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possible adverse impact on the environment and human health. It falls to the 
national court to determine if that is the situation in the case in the main 
proceedings.
6 On Ambient Air Quality in France
Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 24 October 2019 in Case C-636/18 – 
European Commission v French Republic
6.1 Subject Matter
This judgment concerns an infringement action against France for not having 
complied with Articles 13 and 23 of Directive 2008/50/EC on ambient air qual-
ity and cleaner air for Europe (the Air Quality Directive) at several locations 
since 2010.
6.2 Judgment (Not Available in English)
1) En dépassant de manière systématique et persistante la valeur limite an-
nuelle pour le dioxyde d’azote (NO2) depuis le 1er janvier 2010 dans douze 
agglomérations et zones de qualité de l’air françaises, à savoir Marseille 
(FR03A02), Toulon (FR03A03), Paris (FR04A01), Auvergne-Clermont-Ferrand 
(FR07A01), Montpellier (FR08A01), Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées (FR12A01), zone 
urbaine régionale (zur) Reims Champagne-Ardenne (FR14N10), Grenoble 
Rhône-Alpes (FR15A01), Strasbourg (FR16A02), Lyon Rhône-Alpes (FR20A01), 
zur Vallée de l’Arve Rhône-Alpes (FR20N10) et Nice (FR24A01), et en dépas-
sant de manière systématique et persistante la valeur limite horaire pour le 
NO2 depuis le 1er janvier 2010 dans deux agglomérations et zones de qualité 
de l’air, à savoir Paris (FR04A01) et Lyon Rhône-Alpes (FR20A01), la Répub-
lique française a continué de manquer, depuis cette date, aux obligations qui 
lui incombent en vertu de l’article 13, paragraphe 1, de la directive 2008/50/CE 
du Parlement européen et du Conseil, du 21 mai 2008, concernant la qualité 
de l’air ambiant et un air pur pour l’Europe, lu en combinaison avec l’annexe 
xi de cette directive, et ce depuis l’entrée en vigueur des valeurs limites 
en 2010.
La République française a manqué, depuis le 11 juin 2010, aux obligations qui 
lui incombent en vertu de l’article 23, paragraphe 1, de ladite directive, lu en 
combinaison avec l’annexe xv de celle-ci, et en particulier à l’obligation, établie 
à l’article 23, paragraphe 1, deuxième alinéa, de la même directive, de veiller à 
ce que la période de dépassement soit la plus courte possible.
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7 On the Obligation of Ensuring Effective Public Participation and 
Judicial Protection under the eia Directive
Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 7 November 2019 in Case C-280/18 – 
Alain Flausch e.a. tegen Ypourgos Perivallontos kai Energeias e.a.
7.1 Subject Matter
This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Articles 6 
and 11 of Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public 
and private projects on the environment (the eia Directive). The request has 
been made in proceedings brought by Alain Flausch and other parties against 
the Ypourgos Perivallontos kai Energeias (Minister for the Environment and 
Energy, Greece), and other authorities, concerning the legality of the measures 
authorising construction of a tourist resort on the island of Ios (Greece). Infor-
mation about the public participation procedure and the right to challenge the 
authorisation procedure for such project were made available at the island of 
Syros, located 55 nautical miles from Ios. The referring court asked, in essence, 
whether Article 6 of the eia Directive must be interpreted as meaning that a 
Member State may carry out the procedures for public participation in 
 decision-making that relate to a project at the level of the headquarters of the 
competent regional administrative authority, and not at the level of the mu-
nicipal unit within which the site of the project falls. Moreover, the referring 
court asked in essence whether, in the light of the answer given to the first 
question, Articles 9 and 11 of the eia Directive must be interpreted as preclud-
ing legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which provides 
that the announcement of the approval of a project on a specific website sets 
running a period of 60 days for bringing proceedings.
7.2 Key Findings
38 In that regard, the conditions for access to the participation procedure file 
must be such as to enable the public concerned to exercise its rights effectively, 
which entails accessibility to the file under easy conditions.
39 Any difficulties encountered by the public concerned in this regard may, 
however, be justified by the existence of a disproportionate administrative 
burden for the competent authority.
43 It is for the referring court to establish whether the principle of effective-
ness was, in that regard, complied with in the procedure at issue in the main 
proceedings, by assessing compliance with requirements analogous to those 
referred to in paragraphs 38 and 39 above.
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44 Accordingly, the answer to the first question is that Article 6 of the eia 
Directive must be interpreted as precluding a Member State from carrying out 
the procedures for public participation in decision-making that relate to a 
project at the level of the headquarters of the competent regional administra-
tive authority, and not at the level of the municipal unit within which the site 
of the project falls, where the specific arrangements implemented do not en-
sure that the rights of the public concerned are actually complied with, a mat-
ter which is for the national court to establish.
56 It would, on the other hand, be incompatible with the principle of effec-
tiveness to rely on a period against a person if the conduct of the national 
 authorities in conjunction with the existence of the period had the effect of 
 totally depriving him of the opportunity to enforce his rights before the 
 national courts, that is to say, if the authorities, by their conduct, were 
 responsible for the delay in the application (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 
May 2011, Iaia and Others, C-452/09, EU:C:2011:323, paragraph 21).
57 Finally, it is apparent from Article 11(3) of the eia Directive that the Mem-
ber States must pursue an objective of wide access to justice when they lay 
down the rules governing review procedures in respect of public participation 
in decision-making (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 April 2013, Edwards and 
Pallikaropoulos, C-260/11, EU:C:2013:221, paragraphs 31 and 44, and of 17 Octo-
ber 2018, Klohn, C-167/17, EU:C:2018:833, paragraph 35).
58 It may be pointed out in this regard that, as is clear from the answer to the 
first question, the public concerned must be informed of the consent proce-
dure and of its opportunities to participate in it adequately and sufficiently in 
advance. If that is not the case, members of the public concerned cannot ex-
pect to be informed of a final decision granting consent.
59 That is especially so in circumstances such as those at issue in the main 
proceedings. Indeed, the mere ability to have access ex post on the Ministry of 
the Environment’s website to a decision granting consent cannot be regarded 
as being sufficient in the light of the principle of effectiveness since, in the 
absence of sufficient information on the launch of the public participation 
procedure, no one can be deemed informed of the publication of the corre-
sponding final decision.
8 On the Scope of Harmonisation and the Meaning of the Duty to 
Recover Costs of Water Services under the Water Framework Directive
Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 7 November 2019 in Joined Cases 
C-105/18 to C-113/18 – Asociación Española de la Industria Eléctrica (unesa) and 
Others v Administración General del Estado
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8.1 Subject Matter
These requests for a preliminary ruling concern the interpretation of Article 
191(2) tfeu, Article 9(1) of Directive 2000/60/EC establishing a framework for 
Community action in the field of water policy (the Water Framework Direc-
tive), Article 3(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC concerning common rules for the 
internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC and Article 
107(1) tfeu. The requests have been made in proceedings between, of the 
one part, Asociación Española de la Industria Eléctrica (unesa) and several 
other Spanish hydroelectricity producers and, of the other, the Administración 
 General del Estado (General administration of the State, Spain), concerning 
the lawfulness of a tax on the use of inland waters for the production of elec-
tricity. Among others, the referring court asked, in essence, whether Article 
191(2) tfeu and Article 9(1) of Directive 2000/60 must be interpreted as pre-
cluding a tax on the use of inland waters for the production of electricity, such 
as the tax at issue in the cases in the main proceedings, which does not incen-
tivise the efficient use of water, or establish mechanisms for the preservation 
and protection of public water resources, the quantification of that tax being 
unconnected to the capacity to cause damage to the public water resources, 
as it is focused solely and exclusively on the income-generating capacity of 
hydroelectricity producers. Moreover, the referring court asked, in essence, 
whether the principle of non-discrimination, as provided for in Article 3(1) of 
Directive 2009/72, must be interpreted as precluding a tax, such as the tax at 
issue in the cases in the main proceedings, which exclusively affects hydro-
electricity generators operating in river basins encompassing more than one 
autonomous community.
8.2 Key Findings
30 It follows that since the polluter pays principle is expressly referred to in 
Article 9(1) of Directive 2000/60 and that directive was adopted on the basis of 
Article 175(1) EC (now Article 192 tfeu), whether that principle applies to the 
cases in the main proceedings must be examined on the basis of Article 9(1) of 
Directive 2000/60.
35 In that regard, the fact that the second indent of the second subparagraph 
of Article 9(1) refers to the different water uses, which must contribute ade-
quately to the principle of recovery of the costs of water services confirms that 
the obligation to take that principle into account is imposed in the context of 
the Member States’ general policy relating to those services. Such an interpre-
tation is indeed confirmed by the wording of the third subparagraph of Article 
9(1), according to which Member States may have regard to the social, envi-
ronmental and economic effects of the recovery of those costs as well as the 
geographic and climatic conditions of the region or regions affected,  thereby 
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leaving discretion to the Members States as regards the implementation of the 
principle of the recovery of costs.
36 It is, therefore, apparent from the wording of Article 9(1) of Directive 
2000/60 that it is only in the light of all the relevant national rules implementing 
programmes of measures governing water services that it could be ascertained 
whether a Member State has taken into account the principle of the recovery 
of the costs of those services. It follows that compliance with Article 9(1) can-
not be assessed by reference to a national measure, taken in isolation, which 
applies to the users of water resources.
45 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first ques-
tion is that Article 191(2) tfeu and Article 9(1) of Directive 2000/60 must be 
interpreted as not precluding a tax on the use of inland waters for the produc-
tion of electricity, such as the tax at issue in the cases in the main proceedings, 
which does not incentivise the efficient use of water, nor establish mechanisms 
for the preservation and protection of public water resources, the quantifica-
tion of that tax being unconnected to the capacity to cause damage to those 
public water resources, as it is focused solely and exclusively on the income-
generating capacity of hydroelectricity producers.
50 In the present case, it must be pointed out that since it is apparent from 
the information before the Court that the situations at issue in the main 
proceedings are purely internal, in the sense that they are devoid of any 
cross-border element and that the tax on the use of inland waters for the 
production of electricity at issue constitutes a tax measure, the principle of non- 
discrimination, as provided for in Article 3(1) of Directive 2009/72, is applicable 
to that tax only if it that directive seeks to harmonise the Member States’ tax 
provisions.
51 As regards the objective of Directive 2009/72 which consists in completing 
an internal market in electricity, the EU legislature used the ordinary legisla-
ture procedure provided for in Article 95(1) EC (now Article 114(1) tfeu), for 
the adoption of measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by 
law, regulation or administrative action in Member States in the establishment 
and functioning of the internal market.
52 However, in accordance with the wording of Article 95(2) EC (now Article 
114(2) tfeu), Article 95(1) (now Article 114(2) tfeu), is not to apply to fiscal 
provisions.
53 Since Directive 2009/72 is not a measure for the approximation of the 
Member States’ fiscal provisions, it must be found that the principle of non-
discrimination provided for in Article 3(1) thereof does not apply to a tax, such 
as the tax on the use of inland waters for the production of electricity at issue 
in the cases in the main proceedings.
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54 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the second 
question is that the principle of non-discrimination, as provided for in Article 
3(1) of Directive 2009/72, must be interpreted as not precluding a tax, such as 
the tax on the use of inland waters for the production of electricity at issue in 
the cases in the main proceedings, which exclusively affects hydroelectricity 
generators operating in river basins encompassing more than one autonomous 
community.
9 On the Meaning of the Polluter-Pays Principle and the Principle of 
Non-Discrimination under the EU Provisions for an Internal 
Market in Electricity
Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 7 November 2019 in Joined Cases 
C-80/18 to C-83/18 – Asociación Española de la Industria Eléctrica (unesa) and 
Others v Administración General del Estado and Others
9.1 Subject Matter
These requests for a preliminary ruling concern the interpretation of Article 
191(2) tfeu, Article 3(1) and (2) of Directive 2009/72/EC concerning common 
rules for the internal market in electricity, Articles 3 and 5 of Directive 2005/89/
EC concerning measures to safeguard security of electricity supply and infra-
structure investment, and Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’). The requests have been made in 
proceedings between (i) Asociación Española de la Industria Eléctrica (une-
sa) and other parties against the Administración General del Estado (General 
administration of the State, Spain), concerning the lawfulness of the taxes on 
the production of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste from nuclear power 
generation and on the storage of such nuclear fuel and waste in centralised 
facilities. First, the referring court asked, in essence, whether Articles 20 and 21 
of the Charter and Article 3(1) of Directive 2009/72 must be interpreted as pre-
cluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the cases in the main pro-
ceedings, establishing taxes on the production and storage of nuclear fuel and 
waste, which are applied only to electricity-generating undertakings using nu-
clear energy, and the main objective of which is not to protect the environ-
ment but to increase the amount of revenue for the electricity financial sys-
tem. Moreover, the referring court asked, in essence, whether Article 3(2) of 
Directive 2009/72 must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such 
as that at issue in the cases in the main proceedings, when the environmental 
objective and the characteristics that define environmental taxes provided for 
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in that legislation are not specified in the statutory provision having legislative 
force in that legislation.
9.2 Judgment
1. The principle of non-discrimination, as provided for in Article 3(1) of Direc-
tive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing 
Directive 2003/54/EC must be interpreted as not precluding national legisla-
tion establishing taxes on the production and storage of nuclear fuel and waste, 
such as those taxes at issue in the cases in the main proceedings, which apply 
only to electricity-generating undertakings using nuclear energy and the main 
objective of which is not to protect the environment but to increase the 
amount of revenue for the electricity financial system.
2. Article 3(2) of Directive 2009/72 must be interpreted as not precluding 
national legislation, such as that at issue in the cases in the main proceedings, 
when the environmental objective and the characteristics that define environ-
mental taxes provided for in that legislation are not specified in the statutory 
provision having legislative force in that legislation.
10 On the Imposition of a Penalty Payment and a Lump Sum on 
Ireland for Persisting in Non-performing an Environmental Impact 
Assessment
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 12 November 2019 in Case C-261/18 – 
European Commission v Ireland
10.1 Subject Matter
This case concerns an infringement action against Ireland under Article 260(2) 
tfeu for failure to comply with the judgment of the Court in case C-21/06 
Commission v Ireland of 3 July 2008, in which Ireland was condemned for fail-
ure to perform and environmental impact assessment under the eia Directive 
of the effects of the wind farm and associated works at Derrybrien, Country 
Galway (Ireland). The Commission asked the Court of Justice to impose both a 
penalty payment and a lump sum for such a failure.
10.2 Judgment
1. Declares that, by failing to take all measures necessary to comply with the 
judgment of 3 July 2008, Commission v Ireland (C-215/06, EU:C:2008:380), Ire-
land has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 260(1) tfeu;
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2. Orders Ireland to pay the European Commission a lump sum in the 
amount of eur 5 000 000;
3. Orders Ireland to pay the Commission a periodic penalty payment of 
eur 15 000 per day from the date of delivery of the present judgment until the 
date of compliance with the judgment of 3 July 2008, Commission v Ireland 
(C-215/06, EU:C:2008:380);
11 On the Deadline to Revise a Waste Management Plan under the 
New Waste Directive
Judgment of the Court (Eight Chamber) of 5 December 2019 in Case C-642/18 – 
European Commission v Kingdom of Spain
11.1 Subject Matter
This case concerns an infringement procedure against Spain for failure, in par-
ticular, to revise the waste management plans provided for in the New Waste 
Directive, concerning the Autonomous Communities of the Balearic Islands 
and the Canary Islands. Yet, there was confusion as about the deadline to com-
ply with the duty to revise the plan under the Directive.
11.2 Key Findings
21 In the first place, as is apparent in the reply, the Commission interpreted 
Article 30(1) of that directive, which provides that Member States are to ensure 
that waste management plans are evaluated at least every sixth year and re-
vised as appropriate, as meaning that it required Member States to revise those 
plans within 6 years of the date of entry into force of that directive, namely 
from 12 December 2008.
22 However, the obligation to evaluate and, where necessary, to revise the 
waste management plans adopted by the Autonomous Communities of the 
Balearic Islands and the Canary Islands, laid down in Article 30(1) of Directive 
2008/98, could arise only on the date of expiry of the deadline for transposition 
of that directive, as follows from Article 40(1) of that directive, namely 12 
 December 2010.
23 Consequently, the deadline for Member States to fulfil their obligations 
under Article 30(1) of Directive 2008/98 expired only 6 years after the expiry of 
the deadline for transposition of that directive, that is to say on 12 December 
2016.
24 Consequently, by giving notice to the Kingdom of Spain, on 18 November 
2016, to put an end to an alleged breach of the obligation laid down in Article 
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30(1) of that directive, the Commission prematurely opened the pre-litigation 
stage of the procedure provided for in Article 258 tfeu.
25 Since the obligation which the Commission alleges was breached did not 
arise until after the date on which the letter of formal notice was issued, no 
failure to fulfil the obligation laid down in Article 30(1) could be validly invoked 
by the Commission.
30 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the Commission’s action 
for failure to fulfil obligations must be dismissed as inadmissible.
12 On the Adoption of Coercive Detention for Failure to Adopt and 
Effective Air Quality Plan
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 19 December 2019 in Case C-752/18 – 
 Deutsche Umwelthilfe eVvFreistaat Bayern
12.1 Subject Matter
This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of the first 
sentence of Article 9(4) of the Convention on access to information, public 
participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental mat-
ters, (the Aarhus Convention), of Articles 4(3) and 19(1) teu, of Article 197(1) 
tfeu and of the first paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union. The request has been made in proceedings be-
tween Deutsche Umwelthilfe eV, a non-governmental organisation promoting 
environmental protection, and Freistaat Bayern (the Land of Bavaria, Germa-
ny) concerning the enforcement of an injunction requiring the adoption of 
traffic bans in order to comply with the obligations flowing from the Air Qual-
ity Directive. By its question, the referring court seeked, in essence, to ascertain 
whether EU law, in particular the first paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, 
must be interpreted as meaning that, in circumstances in which a national 
authority persistently refuses to comply with a judicial decision enjoining it to 
perform a clear, precise and unconditional obligation flowing from the Air 
Quality Directive, EU law empowers or even obliges the national court having 
jurisdiction to order the coercive detention of office holders involved in the 
exercise of official authority.
12.2 Key Findings
41 That said, in the present instance the referring court considers that it can-
not secure compliance with the principle of the effectiveness of EU law and 
the right to an effective remedy unless EU law empowers or even obliges it to 
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 disregard the reasons of a constitutional nature which, in its view, prevent the 
application of coercive detention to office holders involved in the exercise of 
official authority.
48 Whilst it is apparent from the oral argument at the hearing before the 
Court that doubts remain as to whether the conditions that would allow the 
coercive detention provided for by German law to be ordered in respect of of-
fice holders involved in the exercise of official authority are fulfilled, it is for the 
referring court alone to determine whether the relevant national provisions 
are, in the light of their wording and substance, sufficiently accessible, precise 
and foreseeable in their application and thus enable all risk of arbitrariness to 
be avoided.
49 If that is not so, the national court cannot order coercive detention solely 
on the basis of the principle of effectiveness and of the right to effective judi-
cial protection. Any limitation on the right to liberty must be provided for by a 
law that meets the requirements recalled in paragraph 46 of the present 
judgment.
51 As the Advocate General has observed in point 86 of his Opinion, since 
the ordering of coercive detention entails a deprivation of liberty, recourse 
may be had to such an order only where there is no less restrictive measure 
that enables the objective pursued to be attained. It is therefore for the refer-
ring court to determine whether national law governing enforcement can be 
interpreted in conformity with the right to effective judicial protection, to the 
effect that it would authorise the referring court to adopt measures that do not 
impinge upon the right to liberty, such as those referred to in paragraph 40 of 
the present judgment.
52 It is only if the referring court were to conclude that, in the context of the 
balancing exercise referred to in paragraph 45 of the present judgment, the 
limitation on the right to liberty which would result from coercive detention 
being ordered complies with the conditions laid down in that regard in Article 
52(1) of the Charter that EU law would not only authorise, but require, recourse 
to such a measure.
56 In the light of all the foregoing, the answer to the question referred is that 
EU law, in particular the first paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, must be 
interpreted as meaning that, in circumstances in which a national authority 
persistently refuses to comply with a judicial decision enjoining it to perform 
a clear, precise and unconditional obligation flowing from EU law, in partic-
ular from Directive 2008/50, it is incumbent upon the national court having 
jurisdiction to order the coercive detention of office holders involved in the 
exercise of official authority where provisions of domestic law contain a legal 
basis for ordering such detention which is sufficiently accessible, precise and 
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 foreseeable in its application and provided that the limitation on the right to 
liberty, guaranteed by Article 6 of the Charter, that would result from so order-
ing complies with the other conditions laid down in that regard in Article 52(1) 
of the Charter. On the other hand, if there is no such legal basis in domestic 
law, EU law does not empower that court to have recourse to such a measure.
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